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INTRODUCTION
Criminal convictions for less serious crimes such as damaging
property or fleeing from the police may result in a prison sentence or
probation.1 Commonly, individuals in such cases will agree to forgo a
criminal trial and enter into a plea bargain,2 in which they may admit
guilt in an effort to secure a more favorable sentence of probation
rather than prison time. Although plea bargains are presumed
constitutional, not every condition of probation is permissible.3 In
assessing the validity of the conditions of probation, courts have taken
two different approaches: (1) constitutional analysis approach;4 and (2)

* J.D. candidate, May 2007, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology. Meira Greenberg would like to thank her mom and sister for their
unconditional love and support. She dedicates this Comment to them, as well as in
loving memory of her dad Yaakov Avramson.
1
See generally Federal Sentencing Guidelines, November 1, 2006; Alabama v.
Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 658 (2002).
2
The Lectric Law Library, available at http://www.lectlaw.com/def2/p053.htm
(last visited on November 29, 2006).
3
See, e.g., Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 435-37 (1984).
4
United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001).
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the consent/contract approach.5 Courts that have used the first
approach engage in a determination of whether the condition agreed to
is constitutional6 whereas courts that have used the second approach
engage in a determination of whether the condition was accepted
voluntarily.7 This Comment contends that the constitutional approach
is better and argues that the consent/contract approach improperly
hooks the crook when it upholds constitutionally questionable
probationary conditions upon the basis that a convict voluntarily
consents to the condition to avoid a prison sentence.
Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, in United States v. Barnett, upheld an agreed order that
required the accused to consent to suspicionless searches during the
probation period.8 Judge Posner,9 writing for the unanimous three
judge panel, reasoned that probationers may be subject to
suspicionless searches because they voluntarily consent to waive their
Fourth Amendment rights in favor of the less appealing choice of
facing a prison sentence, which is similar to many waivers made by
recipients of plea bargain agreements.10
The Barnett decision is important because it lends credence to the
consent approach, a little used argument asserted to support the
suspicionless search of a probationer.11 Under the consent theory, an
individual waives their right to Fourth Amendment protection and
procedure, and thus the requirement that searches be reasonable is
deemed moot.12 Thus, Barnett supports a loophole by which the state
5

United States v. Barnett, 415 F.3d 690, 692 (7th Cir. 2005).
Knights, 534 U.S. at 118.
7
Barnett, 415 F.3d at 692.
8
Id.
9
Judge Richard Posner is an expert in the economics of law. He has published
many works on this topic. http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/posner-r/
10
Barnett, 415 F.3d at 692.
11
Prior to Barnett, practitioners had attempted to use the consent theory, but
the Supreme Court specifically declined to review this line of reasoning because the
search was permissible under the standard Constitutional analysis approach. United
States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 120 n.6 (2001).
12
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).
6
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may conduct searches that are not permissible under the Fourth
Amendment so long as the probationer consents to such searches as a
prerequisite of probation in lieu of a prison sentence.13
This Comment will contend that the Seventh Circuit’s decision in
Barnett did not sufficiently examine the propriety of upholding a
suspicionless search within the terms of a plea bargain agreement upon
the consent approach because such requirements are unreasonable
under constitutional analysis. Thus, a suspicionless search as a
probationary term constitutes an unconstitutional condition absent
more direction from the Supreme Court that either a suspicionless
search is permissible under the Fourth Amendment or that the consent
approach justifies complete removal of a probationer’s Fourth
Amendment rights.
Part I of this Comment lays out the landscape of a probationer’s
Fourth Amendment protection by briefly discussing the case law
leading up to the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Barnett. Part II recounts
the Barnett litigation by setting forth the procedural and factual record
and then detailing the opinion issued by the court. Part III analyzes the
consent theory by comparing the typical consent case in which the
individual is not in custody to the consent given by an individual as a
prerequisite of probation. Part IV examines the contours of a plea
bargain agreement, reviews the sentencing guidelines for probation
and then compares a plea bargain agreement to an agreed order that a
probationer signs as a prerequisite of release. Part V explores the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions and contends that a
probationary suspicionless search condition constitutes an
impermissible condition on constitutional rights. Part VI reviews the
recent Supreme Court decision of Samson v. California and contends
that this decision cautions against permitting suspicionless searches of
probationers. Part VII questions the Seventh Circuit’s assertion that
even if a suspicionless search was an impermissible condition of
probation, the remedy would be rescission and require Barnett to go to
prison.

13

Barnett, 415 F.3d at 692.
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THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTS A PROBATIONER

Probationers are subject to less Fourth Amendment Protection
than a free citizen.14 The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures” by police officers and
other government officials.15 Normally, this constitutional right is
protected by the probable cause and warrant requirement.16 However,
the Supreme Court decisions of Griffin v. Wisconsin and United States
v. Knights lowered the requisite probable cause standard to the
standard of reasonable suspicion for probationers.17 The Court
justified this lowered standard on one of two bases: either that the
search constitutes a special need of the state18 or that in light of the
government’s need and the probationer’s lowered expectation of
privacy, the search is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.19
A. Griffin v. Wisconsin
In 1984, nearly 2,000,000 adults were on probation or parole in
the United States.20 The primary purpose of probation and parole is to
place the offender back into the community; however, the offender’s
release into the community is not without restriction.21 In virtually

14

Knights, 534 U.S. at 119.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
16
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948). The warrant and probable
cause requirements protect individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures and
significantly limit police action.
17
Knights, 534 U.S. at 119; Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 872 (1987).
18
Griffin, 483 U.S. at 872.
19
Knights, 534 U.S. at 122.
20
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1987 at 173.
21
18 U.S.C. § 3561. Probation may be used as an alternative to incarceration,
provided that the terms and conditions of probation can be fashioned so as to fully
meet the statutory purposes of sentencing, including promoting respect for law,
15
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every case, conditions accompany the release of the probationer.22 One
frequently imposed condition of probation requires the probationer to
submit to searches.23 In Griffin, the United States Supreme Court
articulated the scope of a probationer’s Fourth Amendment rights, and
held that those rights did not prohibit a probationer from being
required to consent to searches as a prerequisite of probation.24
The petitioner in Griffin challenged the condition of his
probationary terms which permitted the state to conduct a warrantless
search of his home.25 In that case, the officers conducted a warrantless
search after receiving notice from a known informant that the
probationer may be in possession of weapons.26 The officers did not
obtain a warrant before conducting the search, but rather relied upon
the probationer’s consent to submit to such searches.27
The Griffin Court held that a search of a probationer predicated
upon reasonable suspicion was justified under the special needs
doctrine.28 Reasonable suspicion is a standard determined by weighing
all of the facts including the reliability of the informant and the
probationer’s history to assess whether there is sufficient evidence to
believe that the probationer violated the terms of his probation.29
Although a probationer’s home is subject to Fourth Amendment
protection, the special needs doctrine permits, under limited
circumstances, reductions of a probationer’s Fourth Amendment
providing just punishment for the offense, achieving general deterrence, and
protecting the public from further crimes by the offender.
22
Higdon v. United States, 627 F.2d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 1980). Common
conditions of probation include obeying all laws, refraining from alcohol use,
avoiding association with other convicts, reporting to a probation agent on a regular
schedule, and advising probation agent of any change in address or employment.
23
See, e.g., Owens v. Kelley, 681 F.2d 1362, 1366 (11th Cir. 1982).
24
483 U.S. at 873.
25
Id. at 870.
26
Id. at 872.
27
Id. at 870.
28
Id. at 875. The reasonable suspicion standard is a lower standard than the
probable cause standard.
29
Id. at 871.
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protection because a “special needs beyond that of law enforcement
make the warrant and probable cause requirement impracticable” and
make the search reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.30
The Court reasoned that the state’s operation of a probation
system operates as a special need beyond law enforcement interests, in
part because evidence discovered in such a search is rarely used in
criminal trial, but rather is only admissible at probation revocation
hearings.31 It found that the purposes of probation, to promote
rehabilitation and to prevent recidivism, justify a probation officer
supervising the probationer to ensure that these goals are met, but
cautioned that the degree of supervision is not unlimited.32 Thus,
where an officer has reasonable suspicion that the probationer is
engaged in criminal activity the officer may conduct a search of the
probationer as part of a legitimate probationary condition.33
B. United States v. Knights
After Griffin, the lower courts split on whether the probationary
search condition would permit officers to use incriminating evidence
discovered in the search not only at the probation revocation hearing,
but also in subsequent criminal trials.34 In Knights, the petitioner
challenged a probationary condition that permitted officers to conduct
warrantless searches with or without reasonable cause after evidence
of Knights’ participation in arson was discovered during a search
pursuant to this condition.35 The Knights Supreme Court held that the
30

Id. at 873.
Id. at 873-874; see also Penn. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357
(1998). This case talks about how the normal Fourth Amendment protection
provided by the exclusionary rule, which bars the admission of evidence in violation
of the Fourth Amendment, does not apply in a parole revocation hearing because the
parole revocation process is not inherently adversarial and thus does not demand
safeguards of this nature.
32
483 U.S. at 874-75.
33
Id. at 879.
34
See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 117 (2001).
35
Id. at 114.
31

208

https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol2/iss1/8

6

Greenberg: Hooking the Crook: The Seventh Circuit Justifies the Suspicionles

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 2, Issue 1

Fall 2006

Fourth Amendment permitted the search of a probationer based upon
reasonable suspicion, and thus evidence garnered pursuant to the
search was admissible in future criminal trials.36
The Court reasoned that the search of a probationer is justified
under the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.37 A
search is reasonable if the balance between the probationer’s
reasonable expectation of privacy38 and the government’s interest in
conducting the search justifies the infringement on a probationer’s
Fourth Amendment rights.39 A probationer, by virtue of his status, has
a reduced expectation of privacy.40 Moreover, the Court acknowledged
that “just as other punishments for criminal convictions curtail an
offender’s freedoms, a court granting probation may impose
reasonable conditions that deprive the offender of some freedoms
enjoyed by law-abiding citizens.”41 Consequently, probationers who
are made unequivocally aware of the search condition and who sign
the consent form may reasonably be deemed to have notice of their
lessened privacy rights.42 On the other side of the scale is the
government’s interest in preventing recidivism and promoting
rehabilitation, which counters the probationer’s reduced expectation of
privacy.43 Thus, under the Court’s holding in Knights, the Fourth
Amendment permits courts to condition probation upon submission to
searches conducted with reasonable suspicion because such searches
are reasonable.44
36

Id. at 121.
Id.
38
It is not just the individual’s subjective expectation of privacy, but also the
expectation of privacy that society deems acceptable such that it is willing to protect
that individual’s subjective expectation. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300
(1999).
39
Knights, 534 U.S. at 119.
40
Id.
41
Id.; see also Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 438 (1984).
42
Knights, 534 U.S. at 119.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 121.
37
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Although the government attempted to justify the search based
upon the probationer’s consent to the probationary term, the Court
specifically declined to rule on this argument.45 The government
argued that the probationer had voluntarily accepted the probationary
condition and had the option to decline the terms and go to prison
instead.46 Further, the government argued that such conditions are
analogous to the “voluntary decision defendants often make to waive
their right to trial and accept a plea bargain.”47 However, the Court
declined to determine both whether consent itself justified the search
and whether searches conducted with less than reasonable suspicion
would violate the Fourth Amendment because the search in this case
was conducted with reasonable suspicion and thus permissible.48
The Griffin and Knights cases demonstrate that probationers are
entitled to less Fourth Amendment protection than free-citizens, but
intimate that probationers are not without some degree of protection.49
In assessing the degree of protection the Fourth Amendment requires,
both cases employed a balancing test to determine the government’s
interest in conducting the search and the privacy infringement suffered
by the probationer.50 However, neither case answered the question of
whether a probationer’s consent to a probationary condition would
alone permit the search or whether the Fourth Amendment would
permit a suspicionless search based upon the probationer’s status.
These questions were answered in the affirmative by the Seventh
Circuit.51

45

Id. at 120 n. 6.
Id. at 118.
47
Id.
48
Id. at 120 n. 6.
49
Id.; Griffin, 483 U.S. at 875.
50
Knights, 534 U.S. at 119; Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873.
51
United States v. Barnett, 415 F.3d 690, 693 (7th Cir. 2005).
46
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II. UNITED STATES V. BARNETT:
JUSTIFYING THE SUSPICIONLESS SEARCH OF A PROBATIONER
On July 18, 2005, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled on
the validity of a search conducted by police officers pursuant to a
probationer’s consent to the search as part of the terms of his
probation.52 Judge Posner authored the opinion for a three-judge panel,
which also consisted of Judge Coffey and Judge Kanne.53 The court
upheld the suspicionless search, reasoning that the probationary
waiver should be viewed in light of both consent and plea bargain
analysis since a probationer may contract away their Fourth
Amendment rights, thereby justifying a suspicionless search.54
A. Facts of the Case
Curtis Barnett (“Barnett”) was found guilty of fleeing from police
and destroying state property, both of which are felonies under Illinois
law.55 The trial judge sentenced Barnett to one year of intensive
probation in lieu of a prison sentence.56 As a condition of probation, as
set forth in the agreed order, Barnett was required to “submit to
searches of [his] person, residence, papers, automobile, and/or effects
at any time such requests are made by the Probation Officer, and
consent to the use of anything seized as evidence in Court
proceedings.”57 Barnett’s lawyer acknowledged that Barnett bargained
52

Id. at 691. This case was before the Seventh Circuit on appeal from a
decision by the S.D. of Illinois District Court to deny the motion to quash evidence
because the lower court held that Barnett’s consent to suspicionless searches as part
of his probationary condition provided justification for the search. United States v.
Barnett, No. 03-CR-30170, 2004 WL 391830, at *1 (S.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 2004).
53
Barnett, 415 F.3d at 691.
54
Id. at 692.
55
Id. at 691.
56
Id. The difference between intensive probation as opposed to regular
probation is the number of conditions that an individual is required to subject
himself as a prerequisite of being granted the probationary sentence.
57
Id.
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for these terms so that he could avoid a prison sentence.58 Soon
thereafter, police conducted a suspicionless search of Barnett’s
apartment and discovered a firearm in violation of the terms of his
probation.59
B. Seventh Circuit’s Opinion
The Seventh Circuit held that a suspicionless searches of a
probationer is permissible when the probationer agrees to these
searches as a term of his probation based upon the intersection of both
consent and plea bargain law.60 First, the court looked to normal
consent analysis and acknowledged that an individual may waive their
constitutional rights if the waiver is both knowing and intelligent.61
Second, the court compared the probationary condition of a plea
bargain to a contractual agreement.62 In either case, the court noted
that Barnett was given the choice of prison or probation and
voluntarily accepted the consequences of that decision.63
Consent is an exception to the warrant requirement.64 The Seventh
Circuit reasoned that there was nothing unusual about a person
consenting to a search and relinquishing Fourth Amendment rights
when they believe they will be better off waiving the right than by
standing on it.65 Of course, probation, which subjects individuals to
only occasional suspicionless searches, is less invasive than prison,
which does not provide even a modicum of Fourth Amendment
protection.66 Expanding on this line of reasoning, Judge Posner opined
that a bargained for probation sentence is the equivalent of a plea
58

Id. at 691-92.
Id. at 691.
60
Id. at 692.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id. at 691-92.
64
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).
65
Barnett, 415 F.3d at 692.
66
Id.
59
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bargain.67 He noted that a plea bargain is a form of contract and is thus
enforceable and presumed to benefit both parties, though one party
may give up constitutional rights.68 Accordingly, Barnett gave up very
little considering the alternative of prison that loomed ahead.69
Barnett raised two arguments against validating the suspicionless
search waiver upon the consent approach.70 Barnett argued that the
blanket waiver of Fourth Amendment rights invites officers to abuse
this privilege and conduct arbitrary, capricious or harassing searches.71
In addition, Barnett argued that the contract was indefinite72 because
the waiver he signed subjected him to suspicionless searches, but the
police manual required officers to have reasonable suspicion before
conducting a search of a probationer’s home.73 This, Barnett argued,
created a discrepancy in the terms of the agreed order, which
invalidated the contract.74 The Seventh Circuit rejected both
arguments.75
First, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that interpreting the contract as
an invitation for harassment and improper behavior was inappropriate
because if two interpretations of a contract are possible, and one
interpretation would make the contract unenforceable while the other
term would be enforceable, then the contract is interpreted with the
67

Id. Note that there is a discrepancy as to whether this was an actual plea
bargain agreement. The district court described the probationary condition waiver a
bargain between the people and the State because the judge could have sentenced
him to prison and Barnett was not involuntarily placed on probation since he could
have refused the condition and went to jail. United States v. Barnett, 03-CR-30170,
2004 WL 391830, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 2004).
68
Barnett, 415 F.3d at 692.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
The bargaining process requires that the parties assent to the terms and that
the agreement is definite. Definiteness protects the promissee’s expectation interest.
E. Allen Farnsworth, Contracts, 110 (3d ed. Aspen Publishers, Inc.) (1999)
73
Barnett, 415 F.3d at 692.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 693.
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term that is enforceable.76 Second, it reasoned that the indefinite
argument must fail because the remedy for an indefinite contract is
rescission, which places both parties in the position they would have
been in prior to the contract.77 Under the rescission theory, Barnett’s
position prior to the probation contract was a prison sentence and
Barnett did not want to serve a prison sentence and so withdrew this
argument.78 After dismissing Barnett’s arguments, the Seventh Circuit
queried no further about whether the imposition of a suspicionless
search condition should be upheld by the constitutional approach to a
probationer’s Fourth Amendment rights, unlike the Court’s analysis in
Griffin and Knights.79
III. JUSTIFYING THE SUSPICIONLESS SEARCH UPON CONSENT
The Seventh Circuit erroneously equates the consent given by a
probationer to the consent given by a free individual. It fails to account
for a significant difference, namely, that the free individual retains a
meaningful choice to decline to consent to the search, while the
probationer is subject to the search regardless of his supposed consent.
In part, the Barnett court upheld the suspicionless search because it
reasoned that consent is an exception to the Fourth Amendment
requirement of reasonableness.80 The two cases cited most often in
support of the Seventh Circuit’s view of consent, Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte81 and Zap v. United States,82 evince an important
distinction between consent given by a free individual and consent that
is given in the context of a prerequisite of probation. Failure to
account for this difference undermines the Seventh Circuit’s decision

76

Id.
Id.
78
Id.
79
See id.
80
Id. at 692.
81
412 U.S. 218 (1973).
82
328 U.S. 624 (1946).
77
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to uphold the suspicionless search of a probationer based upon a
consent approach.
In Schneckloth, the Court delineated the parameters of a Fourth
Amendment consent case and determined that an individual need not
be specifically advised of the right to decline an officer’s request to
search for the individual’s consent to validate the search.83 Although it
was widely accepted that consent created an exception to the warrant
requirement, the prosecutor had the burden of proving that the consent
was freely and voluntarily given.84 The narrow question before the
Court was whether an individual could freely and voluntarily give
consent if they were unaware of the ability to decline the officer’s
request to conduct the search.85 “Voluntariness is a question of fact to
be determined from all the circumstances;”86 knowledge of a right to
refuse is only one factor to be taken into account in that
determination.87
The Court created a narrow holding when it proclaimed that the
consent must be both voluntary and given without coercion and only
applies when the subject of the search is not in-custody.88 For
example, if police officers were to come to someone’s door and claim
to have a warrant, then the officer in effect announces “that the
occupant has no right to consent or to resist the search . . . the situation
is instinct with coercion . . . where there is coercion there cannot be
consent.”89 Finally, the Court reasoned that although consent is
considered a waiver of Fourth Amendment rights, waiver is really a
“standard enunciated. . . in the context of the safeguards of a fair
83

412 U.S. at 249.
Id. at 219.
85
Id. at 222.
86
Id. at 226.
87
Id. at 229. Other factors may include age, education, length of detention,
prolonged nature of the questioning, and the physical punishment inflicted such as
the deprivation of food or sleep.
88
Id. at 249. The Court declined to determine the standard of consent for one
who was already in custody, but recognized that other courts are particularly
sensitive to the heightened possibility of coercion in this context. Id. at 240 n. 29.
89
Id. at 234.
84
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criminal trial.”90 Thus, there is a difference between waiver and
consent and the degree of voluntariness needed for each to be
constitutionally permissible.91
Proponents of the consent theory also use Zap v. United States to
support their contention that a suspicionless search may be bargained
for and thus upheld upon the doctrine of consent.92 In Zap, the
petitioner had entered into a contract with the Navy Department in
which he was to conduct experimental work on airplane wings.93 The
contract provided that all accounts and records of the petitioner would
be made available to the government at all times.94 The government
conducted a search pursuant to this term of the contract and discovered
that the petitioner had committed fraud and overcharged for various
fees assessed to the Navy.95 The Court upheld the suspicionless search
conducted pursuant to the terms of the contract reasoning that “to
obtain the government’s business [the petitioner] specifically agreed to
permit inspection of his accounts and records,” and thus he voluntarily
waived his right to privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment.96
In both Schneckloth and Zap the petitioner was free to walk away
and refuse to consent to the search.97 It is axiomatic that a voluntary
choice assumes the ability to decline.98 However, in the case of a
probationer like Barnett, the probationer is not free to walk away from
a plea bargain as the petitioners were free to walk away from
consenting to a search in Schneckloth and Zap.99 The Seventh Circuit
90

Id. at 236.
Id. at 238.
92
328 U.S. 624 (1946).
93
Id. at 626.
94
Id. at 627.
95
Id.
96
Id. at 628.
97
See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 220; Zap, 328 U.S. at 327.
98
See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 169 (1974).
99
See Barnett, 415 F.3d at 692. Had Barnett walked away from the plea
bargain terms he would have been subject to the same searches while in prison. See
generally Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
91
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failed to recognize this important point. Thus, “to speak of consent in
[the context of a probationary waiver] is to resort to a manifest fiction,
for the probationer who purportedly waives his rights by accepting a
condition [he] has little genuine opportunity to refuse.”100 Barnett
could not voluntarily consent to suspicionless searches because if he
refused to sign the probationary waiver, he would be placed in prison
where he would still be subject to suspicionless searches.101
Accordingly, the consent doctrine should not justify the suspicionless
search of a probationer.
Moreover, public policy cautions against using the consent
approach to justify the infringement of a probationer’s constitutional
rights because it could result in a slippery slope of unfettered
prosecutorial discretion. It is easily imagined that the consent theory
could justify a probationary condition that restricted travel, but could
this not, taken to its logical, though extreme, conclusion, justify the
restriction of a probationer’s movement to a 4x4 square, permit the
restriction of speech during certain hours, or allow the conduction of
cavity searches without cause without any indication that these
conditions are in fact necessary for the probationer’s rehabilitation or
for public safety?
Perhaps these conditions sound outlandish and that no one would
consent to such probationary terms. But, are there not thoroughly
invasive searches conducted in prison, a threat of gang rape, murder,
and possible solitary confinement such that an individual faced with
these conditions in prison might voluntarily consent to the
probationary conditions to be carried out in the privacy of his own
home?102 And if probation benefits the probationer, and is given in
return for this consent to these conditions, then under the Seventh
Circuit’s reasoning the probationary terms would be permissible.
100

Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth
Amendment 440-41 (4th ed. 2004).
101
See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U. S. 517 (1984) (holding that prisoners have no
Fourth Amendment protection and thus may be subject to suspicionless searches).
102
See generally http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/March-April2004/feature_brook_marapr04.msp; http://www.geocities.com/prisonmurder/;
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/01/29/60II/main538407.shtml
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Requiring the court to conduct a formal Fourth Amendment
analysis and determine the reasonableness of the search condition
before conditioning probation upon the search requirement, prevents
prosecutorial abuse that might otherwise be upheld under the consent
approach. Thus, the court should not be allowed to require the
prospective probationer to consent to unreasonable probationary
terms.103 This scenario demonstrates an improper “hooking of the
crook” by providing no real choice between the constitutional
infringements outside of the location where the infringement might
occur, yet justifying the infringement upon meaningful consent. The
Seventh Circuit’s failure to adequately account for this distinguishing
fact, inherent in any probationary consent, undermines the analogy
between a normal consent case and probationary consent. However,
the Seventh Circuit did not solely rely on the probationary condition as
a straightforward consent case, but also argued that consent of a
probationary condition as part of a plea bargain, justified the
condition.104
IV. THE PROBATIONARY CONDITION AS A PLEA BARGAIN
The Seventh Circuit improperly implied that a probationer’s
consent to the terms of his probation is the equivalent of a plea
bargain. But even if the probation in Barnett was part of a plea
bargain agreement, the court should still have been required to
demonstrate that the condition of suspicionless searches was
reasonably related and served the purposes of probation. “A plea
bargain is a negotiated agreement between the defense and the
prosecution in a criminal case. Typically the defendant agrees to plead
guilty to a specified charge in exchange for an oral promise of a lower

103

The reasonableness of the search must be determined by conducting a
formal Fourth Amendment analysis and balancing the interest of the state in
conducting the search against the interest of the probationer’s reasonable expectation
of privacy. See Part I.
104
United States v. Barnett, 415 F.3d 690, 691 (2005).
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sentence.”105 Plea bargains are deemed to be valid contractual
agreements that benefit both sides.106 As such, an individual who is
party to an improper plea agreement is entitled to all of the remedies
associated with a contract in addition to other protections that ensure
fairness in criminal proceedings.107
Individuals often waive their constitutional rights within a plea
bargain agreement, but the waivers of these rights are generally related
to the current criminal trial.108 Recall that a plea bargain is an
agreement between the prosecution and the defendant.109 Thus, the
prosecution often requests waivers that assist them at trial and makes
trying the case more cost and time efficient.110 For example, a guilty
plea sometimes involves relinquishing certain constitutional rights,
such as the right against self-incrimination, right to a trial by a jury,
and right to confront accusers.111 But, ordinarily, such plea bargain
waivers may not require waiver of other rights such as protection of
double jeopardy, right to challenge the sentence imposed, and right to
challenge the Defendant’s competency to stand trial.112 Finally, for a
waiver to be upheld, unlike consent, the prosecution is required to
inform the individual of his constitutional right and the right to refuse
105

The Lectric Law Library, available at
http://www.lectlaw.com/def2/p053.htm (last visited on November 29, 2006).
106
Barnett, 415 F.3d at 692; United States v. Rubbo, 396 F.3d 1330, 1334
(11th Cir. 2005);
107
United States v. Cook, 406 F.3d 485, 487-88 (2005).
108
See id.
109
See id. at 486.
110
See generally Liberetti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 33 (1995) (where the
defendant plead guilty, which he acknowledged waived other constitutional rights
against self-incrimination and the right to a jury); Rubbo, 396 F.3d at 1332 (where
the Defendant may agree to cooperate, plead guilty, and waive rights to appeal);
United States v. McKinney, 406 F.3d 744, 745 (5th Cir. 2005) (where the Defendant
agreed to cooperate and help the prosecution secure the convictions of other
individuals involved in the drug distribution scheme).
111
Bennett L. Gershman, Prosecutorial Misconduct, Chapter 7, misconduct in
plea bargaining process.
112
Id.
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the plea bargain.113 Thus many waivers declare the individual’s
constitutional rights and then explicitly inform the individual that by
signing the waiver he forfeits his rights.114
Barnett’s probationary condition that waived all of his Fourth
Amendment protection raises three questions. First, was Barnett’s
probationary waiver in fact a plea bargain or was it a normal
probationary condition that was dubbed a plea bargain? Second, did
the plea bargain terms conform to the purposes and spirit of probation
and should that matter? And third, given that a plea bargain normally
assists the prosecution at the current trial, should a plea bargain that
waives constitutional rights, require infringement of those rights in
subsequent trials?
The language used by the Barnett court in the United States
District Court opinion creates an inference that Barnett’s probation
was not in fact part of the terms of a plea bargain, but rather normal
conditions consented to by a prospective probationer. This inference is
supported by the fact that the district court found that the consent
doctrine should apply and not the doctrine of plea bargaining.115
Although it is true that Barnett’s lawyer conceded that Barnett had
signed and consented to the conditions of intensive probation
supervision and that this consent constituted a bargain between
Barnett and the People of the State of Illinois,116 the government
defended the search on the basis of consent and not on the basis of
enforcing the terms of the plea bargain.117 Further, the court described
this bargain not as an agreement in which Barnett consented to waive
his rights at trial for a reduced sentence, but as a normal consent to
probation where the “condition was one among many accepted in the
place of going to prison.”118 The term bargain was used because the
court stated, “what is not present in this case is a defendant who was
113

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 235 (1973).
See id. at 236.
115
United States v. Barnett, 03-CR-30170, 2004 WL 391830, at *1, (S.D. Ill.
Feb 27, 2004).
116
Id.
117
Id. at *2.
118
Id. at *3.
114
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involuntarily placed on probation . . . and who has no right to refuse
the conditions.”119 This language creates an inference that the bargain
was merely to stay out of prison and not a term of in a comprehensive
plea bargain agreement.
Normally, a prosecutor enters into a plea bargain agreement
before the suspect is convicted and the suspect pleads guilty as part of
the plea bargain in return for the prosecutor’s recommendation of a
reduced sentence.120 Though one may easily recognize that the
prosecutor may well wield more bargaining power, at least there is the
notion that the prosecutor will not be overly greedy in their offered
terms of the plea bargain because to do so would jeopardize their
ability to make a deal that is both cost and time efficient.121 This is not
the case if the defendant is already found guilty and the risks of trial
have passed.122 Post conviction, the prosecutor has all of the cards and
can condition a reduced sentence on any condition he so desires.123 In
this instance the plea bargain analysis should not apply.
But, even if Barnett’s condition was in fact part of a broader plea
bargaining scheme, should not the probationary condition comport
with the policy and purpose behind probation? Probation is an
alternative to incarceration and may serve as in independent sentence
if it is fashioned to fully meet the statutory purposes of sentencing,
“including respect for the law, providing just punishment for the
offense, achieving general deterrence, and protecting the public from
further crimes by the defendant.”124 Further, the court may impose
conditions of probation only to the extent that those conditions are
both reasonably related to the offense or history of the defendant and

119

Id.
Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YLJ
1909 (1992).
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
Id. at 1918; see also Part III supra.
124
Sentencing Guidelines, § 5B1.1, November 1, 2006.
120
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the conditions involve only those deprivations of liberty or property as
are reasonably necessary for the purpose of sentencing.125
The language used by the sentencing guidelines regarding
probation is remarkably close to the analysis conducted in a typical
constitutional approach, namely, a determination of whether the search
is reasonable based upon the government’s interests in ensuring the
rehabilitation of the probationer and preventing recidivism is balanced
against the privacy expectations of the probationer.126 Although it is
clear that a probationary condition that requires submission to searches
predicated upon reasonable suspicion are appropriate both because it
serves the policy and purpose of the probationary statute and is
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, there is no indication that a
suspicionless search standard is equally appropriate because the
Seventh Circuit’s opinion failed to conduct a Fourth Amendment
analysis and neglected to point to any proof in the record that such a
condition was reasonably necessary and conformed to the policies of
the probationary sentence.127
In this case, Barnett was charged with destroying state property
and running from police.128 Assuming we are concerned that this
individual has a higher penchant than the normal citizen to commit
this type of crime based on past performance, is a subsequent
suspicionless search of Barnett’s house or his person likely to stop a
recurrence of this type of crime? Arguably it does not. Nor is it likely
that the police will catch Barnett for recommitting property damage by
subjecting him to suspicionless searches. Thus, the government should
not justify search conditions unrelated to the probationary policy
simply because it attaches such a condition to a plea bargain scheme.
Finally, the waiver required Barnett to both submit to
suspicionless searches and to permit the use of any evidence
discovered during the search in both a probation revocation hearing

125

Id. at § 5B1.3; 18 U.S.C. § 3553
See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001).
127
See United States v. Barnett, 415 F.3d 690, 691 (2005).
128
Id.
126
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and a subsequent criminal trial.129 This issue was not raised by
Barnett’s counsel or by the court; however, this condition should be
deemed impermissible because the United States Supreme Court has
justified removing normal Fourth Amendment protection simply
because of the unique situation of a probationer and the atmosphere of
a probation revocation hearing.130 Normal exclusionary rules and
careful assessment of Fourth Amendment propriety do not apply in a
probation revocation hearing because it is not deemed an adversarial
process.131 Although the Court in United States v. Knights permitted
evidence discovered in a search into a subsequent trial, this was only
after determining the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment
thus the exclusionary rule would not apply.132 Here, not only during an
adversarial process did the Seventh Circuit justify the removal of all
Fourth Amendment protection, but also condoned the expansion of the
primary place in which these protections are most sacrosanct by
allowing evidence to be submitted at a subsequent criminal trial.133
Justifying the complete removal of Fourth Amendment protection
as part of a plea bargaining process, a process where constitutional
rights are dependent upon a kind of contract in which one side has all
of the bargaining power,134 should be narrowly construed and required
to comport with the constitutional guidelines of those rights that the
bargain purports to limit. Although constitutional rights may be
waived within the plea bargain process, these concessions are not
beyond judicial review and may be overturned if the agreement
constitutes an unconstitutional condition.135 The Supreme Court has
consistently refused to justify a search of a probationer or parolee

129

Barnett, 415 F.3d at 691.
Penn. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 534 U.S. 357, 364 (1998).
131
Id. at 365.
132
534 U.S. 112, 122 (2001).
133
See more about this in Scott, 524 U.S. 357.
134
People v. Hernandez, 229 Cal. App. 2d 143 (1964).
135
See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 438 (1984).
130
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upon the consent/contract approach136 and it is arguably because such
a condition would in fact create an unconstitutional condition.
V. DOES THE FOURTH AMENDMENT WAIVER CONSTITUTE AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITION?
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions may invalidate a plea
bargain that conditions probation upon a suspicionless search. The
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions precludes the government from
conditioning discretionary privileges upon an individual’s waiver of a
constitutional right in certain circumstances.137 Thus, even if the
probationer consents to a complete waiver of his Fourth Amendment
rights as a condition of bargained-for-probation, the search condition
may be nonetheless unlawful under this doctrine.138
The Supreme Court’s decision in Minnesota v. Murphy supports
the contention that the government may not condition probation upon
an individual’s waiver of constitutional rights in all circumstances.139
In Murphy, the defendant was twice questioned about the murder and
rape of a teenage girl, but he was never charged with the crime.140 On
an unrelated incident, Murphy pled guilty to a reduced charge of false
imprisonment for which he was sentenced to a suspended prison term
of sixteen months and three years of probation.141 The probationary
terms required Murphy to “participate in a treatment program for
sexual offenders . . . report to his probation officer as directed, and be
truthful with the probation officer ‘in all matters.’”142 During the
course of treatment, Murphy admitted to his counselor that he had

136

Samson v. California, 126 S.Ct. 2193, 2199 n.3 (2006); United States v.
Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001).
137
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994).
138
See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 438 (1984).
139
Id. at 437.
140
Id. at 422.
141
Id.
142
Id.
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committed a rape and murder.143 The counselor relayed this
information to Murphy’s probation officer, who then set up a meeting
during which the probation officer intended to ask Murphy questions
regarding the rape and murder.144 Murphy was compelled to truthfully
answer the probation officer’s questions as a condition of his
probation.145 He asserted that the probationary condition that required
him to answer questions truthfully was in violation of his Fifth
Amendment rights.146
The Court did not agree with Murphy’s assessment of the
probationary condition.147 The Court reasoned that a penalty case is a
situation where the state not only compels an individual to testify, but
also induces their waiver of Fifth Amendment rights by “threatening to
impose economic or other sanctions ‘capable of forcing the selfincrimination which the Amendment forbids.’”148 Thus, a state may
not “expressly or by implication, assert[] that invocation of the
privilege would lead to revocation of probation.”149 The Court
reasoned that Murphy’s probationary conditions prohibited only false
statements, but did not restrict his freedom to answer particular
questions and it did not require that he waive his future Fifth
Amendment rights.150
Similarly, in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,151
the Court limited the government’s ability to condition the receipt of a
benefit upon the waiver of Fourth Amendment rights. In Von Raab, the
government restricted certain jobs with the U.S. customs service
department to those individuals who consented to submit to

143

Id. at 423.
Id.
145
Id. at 424.
146
Id.
147
Id. at 427.
148
Id. at 434.
149
Id.
150
Id. at 436.
151
489 U.S. 656 (1989).
144
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suspicionless drug-testing.152 Specifically, individuals who handled
guns, drugs, or “classified material” were required to submit to such
searches as a condition of employment.153 The Court did not examine
whether employees legally consented to such searches by signing valid
waivers nor did it reason that submission to such searches was
bargained for because the employee had access to better job
positions.154 The Court granted certiorari to determine whether the
government could condition the benefit of employment upon a
prospective employee’s waiver of their Fourth Amendment rights.155
The Court dealt with this question by employing the constitutional
approach.156
Under the constitutional approach, the Court determines the
reasonableness of the search condition by balancing the individual’s
expectation of privacy against the government’s interest in conducting
the search without individualized suspicion.157 The Court
acknowledged that the government had a substantial interest to ensure
that employees who handled guns and drugs were not under the
influence and were trustworthy and dependable.158 Although
individuals have a high expectation of privacy as relates to body fluid
taken for drug testing, the Court held that the government interest
outweighed the individual’s privacy expectation.159 Thus, the
government may condition employment on an employee’s submission
to drug testing where such employee may handle drugs or guns.160
However, the Court declined to uphold the government’s drug testing
152

Id. at 661. Urine testing is a search, and thus must be examined under the
Fourth Amendment test for to determine its reasonableness.
153
Id. at 664.
154
Id. at 660. Employees do not sign waivers, but were sent a later stating that
if they wished to pursue the job they must submit to these searches and that a drug
screening center would contact them to make arrangements.
155
Id. at 665.
156
Id.
157
Id. at 665-66.
158
Id. at 670.
159
Id. at 672.
160
Id. at 679.

226

https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol2/iss1/8

24

Greenberg: Hooking the Crook: The Seventh Circuit Justifies the Suspicionles

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 2, Issue 1

Fall 2006

of employees who handle classified material because the government
failed to demonstrate a serious need to justify the invasion of Fourth
Amendment protection.161
In both Murphy and Von Raab, the Court determined the validity
of certain conditions that the government placed upon a benefit.
Although in each instance it was possible to assess the validity of the
required condition by employing the consent approach and examining
the contractual agreement between the parties, instead, the Court
examined the condition using a constitutional approach.162 Thus the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine applies in situations where the
government “seeks to achieve its desired result by obtaining
bargained-for consent.”163 And the government may only condition a
grant or deny a benefit where the condition is constitutionally
permissible, which requires the court to analyze the conditionality of
the condition.164
A search condition may be constitutionally permissible if it is
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.165 “Where a condition of
probation requires a waiver of precious constitutional rights, the
condition must be narrowly drawn; to the extent that it is overbroad it
is not reasonably related to the compelling state interest in reformation
and rehabilitation and is an unconstitutional restriction on the exercise
of the probationer’s privacy.”166
The Seventh Circuit failed to discuss the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine in Barnett, likely because it had already dismissed
this notion and the language of Minnesota v. Murphy in an earlier

161

Id. at 678.
See, e.g., id. at 665-66. Similarly, this is the same approach the Court
employed in United States v. Knights where the Court was required to determine the
validity of the waiver of Fourth Amendment rights as a prerequisite of probation.
534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001).
163
Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 434 (1984).
164
Id.
165
United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001).
166
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A treatise on the Fourth
Amendment, 5 SearchSzr § 10.10 (2007).
162
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Judge Posner opinion, United States v. Cranley.167 In Cranley, the
court allowed Wisconsin to condition probation upon a probationer’s
waiver of Fifth Amendment rights as a prerequisite to probation
because it reasoned that “Wisconsin need not provide probation as a
possible sentencing option.”168 The court then dismissed the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine because while it agreed that
Wisconsin could not condition probation upon being a non-Jew or
being white, it could condition probation upon the requirement that the
convict provide a “full accounting of any criminal behavior in which
[the convict] engaged.”169 The court acknowledged that this condition
would conflict with the language of the Murphy Court, but reasoned
that in light of cases like Griffin v. Wisconsin and United States v.
Knights, the trend had been to enforce terms associated with a
conditional release.170 Unfortunately, the Seventh Circuit failed to
acknowledge that the probationary terms in those cases were only
enforced because the Court deemed them reasonable in light of Fourth
Amendment analysis.171 Therefore, the Seventh Circuit should have
conducted a Fourth Amendment analysis to decide whether the
suspicionless search of a probationer is reasonable before permitting
the government to condition probation upon the search. The Seventh
Circuit’s shortcut of upholding this search condition upon the
consent/contract approach is thus fatally flawed unless such conditions
are permissible under the Fourth Amendment.
VI. FOURTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS: SAMSON V. CALIFORNIA
When the Seventh Circuit decided Barnett, probationers were
protected under the Fourth Amendment by the reasonable suspicion
standard, as articulated by the Supreme Court in United States v.
167

350 F.3d 617, 620 (7th Cir. 2003).
Id.
169
Id.
170
Id. at 621.
171
See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 121 (2001); Griffin v.
Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 880 (1984).
168

228

https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol2/iss1/8

26

Greenberg: Hooking the Crook: The Seventh Circuit Justifies the Suspicionles

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 2, Issue 1

Fall 2006

Knights.172 Subsequently, in the summer of 2006, the Supreme Court
permitted a suspicionless search of a parolee after determining that the
search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment in Samson v.
California.173 Thus, it is necessary to determine whether the Seventh
Circuit’s decision to uphold the suspicionless search of a probationer
under the consent/contract approach was a harmless error in light of
the more recent Supreme Court case. The Seventh Circuit’s decision to
uphold the probationary condition upon consent may be permissible if
that condition is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, and thus an
appropriate condition of a probationary plea bargain agreement.174
The petitioner in Samson was a parolee who while walking down
the street was approached by a police officer, who knew of Samson’s
parole status and believed that there was a warrant out for Samson’s
arrest.175 Although the police officer soon learned that there was not an
outstanding warrant against Samson, the officer conducted a search of
Samson’s person based solely on Samson’s status as a parolee.176 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari on whether a suspicionless search of
a parolee violated the Fourth Amendment.177
The Samson Court conducted a Fourth Amendment analysis of the
search and determined that a suspicionless search of a parolee is
reasonable.178 An individual’s status determines their reasonable
expectation of privacy.179 The Court used the term “continuum” to
explain the relationship between an individual’s status and their
reasonable expectation of privacy.180 At the highest end of the
continuum is a free citizen who is afforded the full protection of the

172

534 U.S. 112, 122 (2001).
126 S.Ct. 2193, 2196 (2006).
174
See generally Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 438 (1984).
175
126 S.Ct. at 2196.
176
Id.
177
Id.
178
Id. at 2196-97.
179
Id. at 2197.
180
Id. at 2198.
173
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Fourth Amendment.181 At the lowest end of the continuum is a
prisoner who has no expectation of privacy, and thus does not have
any protection under the Fourth Amendment.182 The Court determined
that a parolee has a lower expectation of privacy than a probationer
because parole is in addition to a prison sentence and not in lieu of
prison.183 Thus, parolees are the second lowest on the continuum just
above a prisoner.184
Next, the Court examined the government’s interest in supervising
parolees: preventing recidivism and promoting parolee
rehabilitation.185 The government’s interest in supervising parolees is
“overwhelming” because “parolees are more likely to commit future
criminal offenses.”186 The Court examined the empirical evidence put
forth by the Criminal Justice center in California, which demonstrated
that the recidivism rate of parolees was astronomical.187 The Court
then determined that California’s ability to conduct a suspicionless
search of a parolee serves its interest in reducing recidivism in a
manner that aids rehabilitation and reintegration into society.188
Moreover, the government’s interest in conducting suspicionless
searches is significantly high because parolees are released into
society regardless of whether the parolee is able to reintegrate.189
Thus, requiring officers to have reasonable suspicion before they
conduct a search of a parolee would hinder law enforcement interest in
both promoting rehabilitation and preventing recidivism when these
181

Id.
Id. at 2198 n.2 (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U. S. 517 (1984)).
183
Samson, 126 S.Ct. at 2198 (this is important because a prisoner has no
expectation of privacy and thus a parolee would have been accustomed to police
searches); see Hudson, 468 U.S. 517.
184
Samson, 126 S.Ct. at 2198.
185
Id. at 2200.
186
Id.
187
Id. (noting that 70% of the paroled felons re-offend within 18 months).
188
Id.
189
Id. Prisoners are released after they complete the days of their sentence
which is then reduced by good time credits earned and without regard to whether
that individual is indeed ready for parole.
182
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individuals have not demonstrated a capacity to avoid criminal
conduct.190 Accordingly, the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit a
police officer from conducting a suspicionless search of a parolee
because the balance between the privacy interest of the parolee and the
government’s interests make this search reasonable.191
Although parolees are subject to suspicionless searches, a similar
search standard for a probationer may violate the Fourth Amendment
for two reasons. First, probationers have a greater expectation of
privacy than prisoners and parolees, and therefore should not be
similarly subject to suspicionless searches.192 Second, a suspicionless
search standard would hinder law enforcement efforts.193 Thus both
sides of the balancing test are impacted and demonstrate that the
suspicionless search of a probationer is not justified under the Fourth
Amendment.
The probationer should maintain a degree of Fourth Amendment
protection.194 Parolees have a lesser expectation of privacy than
probationers because parole is more akin to imprisonment than
probation is to imprisonment.195 The probationer is above the parolee
on the continuum and below free citizens on the continuum.196
Accordingly, probationers should be afforded a higher degree of
Fourth Amendment protection than parolees, but less protection than
free citizens.197 The reasonable suspicion standard provides the
appropriate degree of protection.198
Not only does the probationer’s expectation of privacy weigh
against a suspicionless search, but the government’s interest in
conducting the search is less imperative in the case of a probationer
190

Id.
Id. at 2202.
192
See id. at 2198.
193
Id. at 2199.
194
See generally id. at 2198.
195
Id.
196
Id.
197
See generally id.
198
United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122 (2001).
191
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than in the case of a parolee. The parole system at issue in Samson
granted prisoners parole irrespective of whether the inmate was
deemed capable of reintegrating into society.199 It follows that the
government would be significantly concerned about preventing
anticipated future crime of those individuals who have not fully
reformed.200 In contrast, probation is only granted when the sentencing
judge believes that the sentence will be conducive to the convict’s
rehabilitation and the convict does not pose a serious risk of
recidivism that would caution against probation.201 Thus, the Seventh
Circuit should have held that police officers must have a reasonable
suspicion before searching a probationer’s apartment.
VII. RESCISSION OR REFORMATION
The proper remedy of an improperly imposed criminal sentence
should be either reformation or a new trial.202 Yet, the Seventh Circuit
opined that if the plea bargain’s suspicionless search condition was
improper then the proper remedy was rescission, which would indicate
that Barnett would be sentenced to jail.203 The court indicted this was
the proper remedy because it operated under the mistaken assumption
that the only feasible defense against enforcing the terms of Barnett’s
plea bargain was the claim that its terms were indefinite.204 However,
in light of the foregoing analysis, if the probationary terms were
invalid, not only because they were indefinite but also
unconstitutional, then the proper remedy should be reformation of the
sentence or a new trial.
Barnett defended the terms of his probationary conditions,
which independently purported to justify a warrantless and
unreasonable search of his person and property, on the basis that the
199
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plea agreement and the probation office policy guidelines could render
the agreement void for indefiniteness because, he alleged, that the
terms of the plea agreement and the probation office policy guidelines,
which required officers to have reasonable suspicion before
conducting the search, were in contradiction.205 Judge Posner,
however, upheld the search condition reasoning that the condition was
part of a plea bargain in which Barnett received a benefit of not going
to jail and the state received the benefit of being able to keep a close
watch over his activities and use any discovered evidence against
Barnett in a subsequent trial.206 But, if the contract was unenforceable
because it was indefinite then the parties would be returned to the
positions they would have occupied had there been no contract.207
The doctrine of indefiniteness applies when the terms of a
contract are not reasonably certain to create a basis for determining the
existence of a breach or selecting an appropriate remedy.208 In such
cases, the proper remedy is rescission.209 However, in addition to the
indefiniteness argument, this condition may be challenged on the basis
that the parties entered into the agreement on the mistaken belief that
such a condition was constitutionally permissible. The proper review
of a criminal sentence is to determine whether it is unreasonable.210
Where a sentence is deemed improper and unreasonable then the
proper remedy is to reform the verdict or the defendant may be entitled
to a new trial.211 Moreover, neither party has a constitutional right to
explicitly enforce the terms of a plea bargain agreement.212 Thus the
recommended and negotiated sentence does not bind the court.213
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The sentencing court determined that Barnett demonstrated the
ability to be placed on probation, and although the court permitted the
probation with the condition of intensified monitoring, it is entirely
possible and appropriate that Barnett should be re-sentenced and
subject to monitoring by police under terms and conditions that are
constitutionally permissible. Thus, reforming Barnett’s probationary
sentence to subject him to searches conducted with reasonable
suspicion would be an appropriate remedy.214
CONCLUSION
The Seventh Circuit’s consent/contract approach to justifying the
suspicionless search of a probationer improperly hooked the crook in
United States v. Barnett when the court upheld the constitutionally
questionable probationary condition of a suspicionless search upon the
basis that a convict voluntarily consents to the condition to avoid a
prison sentence. The court’s three page decision created a loophole
around constitutional analysis and is problematic both because it paves
the way for prosecutorial misconduct and creates an unconstitutional
condition, summarily dismissing the implication this decision will
have on a probationer’s constitutional rights.
As a consequence of the Barnett decision, the law regarding
proper analysis of probationary conditions became unclear in the
Seventh Circuit. Thus, without further direction from the Supreme
Court, that the suspicionless search of a probationer is permissible
within the bounds of Fourth Amendment protection, courts throughout
the country will inevitably muddle the analysis of questionable
probationary conditions instead of applying a straight forward
constitutional approach and assessing the impact of the probationary
condition on a probationer’s constitutional rights.
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